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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1he Appellees. Aaron B. Buttars. Brenda L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis,
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Appellees") agree that jurisdiction is
properly placed in this court inasmuch as it is an appeal from a final ruling and
Order of the Second District Court wherein the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Appellees resulting in the "Order Quieting Title in 32 X 12.
L.L.C.. and in Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda L. Buttars."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(b)( 1).
Appellees are satisfied with the Statement of Issues made by Appellants and
hereby incorporate said Statement of Issues as part of Appellees' brief.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules nor
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of such central
importance as to require their inclusion here.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An action to quiet title and for trespass and waste to real property were
commenced by Appellants 11.C. Massey and Betty P. Massey in the Second
District Court. Masseys" first amended complaint also alleged a cause of action
for adverse possession. 1lowever. the adverse possession cause of action was
dismissed and is not at issue on appeal. Masseys" claim of title to the real property
is based upon tax deeds conveyed by Weber County.
Responses to Massey's complaint were filed by all Defendants. Responses
to Massey's claims were filed in letter form by Appellees Aaron B. Butlers.
Brenda L. Butters |hereinafter referred to collectively as "Appellees Buttars"] and
Adele B. Lewis, acting pro se at the time R. at 115-21. Appellees1 defenses to
Appellants" claims included: that there has been an unbroken chain of title since
the time the real property was conveyed to private owners by the United Slates
(iovernment., that Appellee Adele B. Lewis had owned and occupied said properly
since 1953. and that Appellees Buttars had done the same since they purchased the
same real property from Appellee Adele B. Lewis in December 1994. R. 115-1 16.
Following various surveys and other discovery. Defendants filed motions
for summary judgment supported by memoranda and various exhibits, including
affidavits. R. 601-83, 785-96 and 852-50. Masseys purported to dispute many of
the facts propounded by Defendants. R. at 815-851. However. Masseys conceded
many facts as well. R. al 8 I5-85 I.
The motions were submitted without oral argument and the Court entered
its "Ruling Conditionally Denying Summary Judgment." R. at 962-67. At a
subsequent telephonic hearing between the Court and counsel and based upon
certain concessions of fact made by Massey's attorney, the Court verbally granted
the Defendants' motions for summary judgment and directed counsel for
Defendants to prepare appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and a final
order. R. at 1014. The Until (hidings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by
Defendants" counsel incorporated by reference the Court's earlier conditional
ruling. R. at 984-99. Copies of the trial court's initial ruling, the transcript of the
subsequent telephonic hearing, and the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
final order arc included in the Addendum to Appellants" brief. Appellants'
Addendum. ^1-4.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. This case involves real property located in the Southeast Quarter o\'
Section 24. Township 6 North. Range 2 West in Weber County. Utah.
2. Masseys purchased four separate parcels located in the Southeast
Quarter at a tax sale. Two of the parcels were purportedly conveyed to
the Masseys by tax deeds dated June 12. 1986. and recorded June 13.
3986. R. at 989-90. The other two parcels were purportedly conveyed
to the Masseys by tax deeds dated June 8. 1992. and recorded June 10.
1992. R. at 990-91. The four "parcels" were contiguous. R. at 839.
3. On February 19. 1953. Defendant Adele IT Lewis and her husband.
James H. Lewis, purchased Parcel Number 15-063-0014 in Weber
County. State of Utah, which is located at 1597 South 1200 West, in
Marriotl-Slaterville. Utah 84404. The legal description of the property
is:
Part of the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of
section 24. township 6 north, range 2 west, salt lake meridian.
U.S. survev. Beginning at a point 20 chains south and 14.56
chains west of the northeast corner of said quarter section.
thence west 75.04 feet, thence north 23' 08' west 250 feet.
thence north 155 feet, thence cast 5.44 chains thence south
7.3 chains to the place of bcgirning. Containing 3.1 acres.
more or less. R. at 789. 823.
4. On January 26. 1993. Defendant Adele B. Lewis' husband passed avvav,
but Defendant Adele B. Lewis continued to own. use and occupy all of
the ground on the above-mentioned parcel until she sold the property to
her daughter and son-in-law. Aaron B. and Brenda L. Buttars. R. at
790. 825.
5. Defendant Adele B. Lewis sold the above-mentioned property to her
daughter and son-in-law on December 5. 1994. By way thereof.
Defendant Adele B. Lewis sold all of her right, title and interest in the
Property to Defendants Aaron B and Brenda L. Buttars. Although
Defendant Adele B. Lewis sold the property to the Defendants Buttars.
she continues to live on that same property. R. at 790, 825.
6. Fhe Defendants, Kenneth A. Griffilhs| Griffiths |. BKB, LLC |BKB| and
12 X 12, L.L.C1. 112X121 are each successors in interest to a parcel of
real property |hereinafter referred to as the (irifliths Property | also
located in the Southeast Quarter of Section 24. R. at 604-05. fhe
Griffiths Property was conveyed to (irifliths by Warranty Deed dated
September 10. 1993, and recorded on September 23, 1993. R. at 643-
44. (irifliths conveyed the Griffiths Properly to BKB by Warranty
Deed dated and recorded January 24. 1994. BKB conveyed the
(irifliths Properly lo 12X12 by Quit Claim Deed dated October 26.
2000. and recorded November 1. 2000. R. at 987.
7. fhe Griffiths Properly, now owned by 12X12. is located north of the
Buttars" Property. R. at 839. A "very old fence" serves as the
occupation line between the (irifliths Property and the Buttars Property.
R. at 818. I he legal description of Masseys' tax deed properties
straddles the old fence and overlaps the historical occupation of the
(irifliths Property and the Buttars' Property. R. at 819. I he Defendants
and their predecessors in interest have occupied the area of their
respective properties up to the "very old fence" for more than 20 years
immediately preceding the initiation of the above-entitled action. R. at
8 18. 987-8. Said Defendants and their predecessors have paid taxes on
legal descriptions contained in the tax notices issued to them by Weber
County for a period of more than 20 years immediately preceding the
initiation of the above-entitled action. R. at 987. 989. 1014. p. 10.
8. An expert surveyor has concluded that Weber County did not have any
interest in the property to be conveyed at the tax sale and that the deeds
to properly allegedly conveyed were based on a convey ancc made by an
earlier grantor possessing no interest in ihe real property to be
conveyed. R. at 607-609 and R. at 760-761, and 763.
9. Appellants" own expert witness. Cynthia L. Segriff. a registered land
surveyor, stated in her aflldav it that "the real property conveyed in the
tax deeds does overlap and conllict with the occupation of the properties
by Defendants BKB, LLC, Questar Gas Company, Aaron B. Buttars,
Brenda L. Buttars and Adele B. Lewis, or their successors." R. at 274-
5.
0. Ms. Segri ff slated in her report and/or at her deposition that:
a. "I believe that these deeds not only cloud the title of record but also
convey a fraud (fraud order)." R. at 755-6.
b. "1 believe the tax deeds sold the property to Massey in which Weber
County - they may have had an interest in it for the (ax notices, the
lax money that they were expecting to receive, but they did not own
the property to sell it." R. at 756.
c. "! believe that Weber County conveying it to the Masseys and it
being overlaid the way it is. the county not having acknowledgment
as to where that property actually lay before making up the deeds
and selling them, was and I do believe that this was very strong
language, but...1 say I do believe it was very strong language, but I
do think that it was rather fraudulent i:i - or misrepresented, okay?
Misrepresenting what the - what the property was and the county
selling the property like they did..." R. at 757.
1. Defendants' Lxpert John B. Stahl. stated :n his affidavit that:
a. Ihe tax deeds conveyed to Appellants were based "upon a quit claim
deed dated September 25. 1979 purporting to convey property within
which no interest was held by the grantor." R. at 761.
b. " fhe BKB. Qucsiar and Buttars properties are contiguous. (Sec Pg.v
4 and 25. Survey findings Report)." R. at 762-3.
12. Appellants, by and through their attorney, have conceded the following:
d.
No doubt the fences in the area have existed for a long period ol
ime." R. at S 1S.
'...12 x 12. Qucstar and Buttars. or their predecessor in interest.
lave occupied the respective parcels up to the old existing fence
ines for a substantial period of lime." R. at 818.
"...the property in question that we claim under the tax deeds lias
listorically been occupied by the defendants and their predecesst >rs
n interest together with the — the Questar Gas property and their
"iredecessors in interest. It's one of the three parties have occupied
ill of that property which we arc claiming under our tax deeds.
...for at least twenty years." R. at 1014, Appellants' Addendum.
§2. p. 9. hues 7-15.
'I would concede that they (the Defendants j have paid taxes on the
ax notices that were issued to them by the county." R. at 1014.
Appellants' .Addendum. ^2. p.10. lines 13-14.
SLIYIMARV OK ARGUMENTS
The trial court appropriately granted Appellees' Motion for Summary
Judgment viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving partv
Appellants and finding no dispute as to material facts. I he findings of fact and
Conclusions of 1,n\v resulting in the "()rder Quieting Title to Real Property in I2
X 12. L.L.C.. and in Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda I . Buttars" arc appropriately
supported by the pleadings and supporting documeiils submitted in the trial court's
summary judgment proceedings.
first. Appellants did not take title to the disputed property because Weber
County did not have any title lo convey. A prerequisite to holding a tax sale is that
the owners oflhe property be delinquent in paying taxes for said property.
Appellees believe thai under I hah law. the tax sale is therefore of no effect.
Additionally, purchasers of 1ax Deeds take title subject to and along with the
infirmities in the grantor's title, such as a boundary by acquiescence claim. The
taxes for the properties in question were all paid in full by Appellees and current at
the time of the tax sale. All oflhe Appellees and their predecessors in interest had
paid the property taxes assessed and had occupied the disputed property for at
least 20 years prior to commencement of this action. Therefore. Weber Counlv
did not possess title to the properties and could not convey title to said properties
by Tax \)eed and Appellants1 Tax Deeds are null. void, and of no effect.
Second, even if the Court llnds that Weber County was able to convey title
to the land described in the Iax I)eeds to Appellants, title to the properly held bv
Appellees is superior to that of Appellees under 1Uah statute and case law. for an
unrecorded interest in real property to be void as against any subsequent purchaser
of said real property, the subsequent purchaser must: I) purchase the property in
good faith, that is. without actual or constructive notice of the possibility of any
other unrecorded interest in the property and 2) record their document first.
Moreover. Appellees and their predecessor interest holders have occupied said
properties continuously for al least 20 years prior to this action (as conceded by-
Appellants), and this continuing adverse possession. Il has also been conceded by
Appellants thai Appellees and their predecessor interest holders have all paid the
taxes due as for the property described by tax notices received by Appellees for at
least 20 years prior to this action. Appellants, as subsequent purchasers were on
actual, or at the very least, constructive notice of the possibility of a problem with
the title to the property held by Weber County. Therefore. Appellants are
precluded from taking in good faith and Appellees therefore are the lawful owners
thereof.
ARGUMENT
I. The Tax Deeds Conveyed No Title To Appellants Because
Weber County Had No Title To Convey.
Appellant's claims herein are based upon four tax deeds, two of which are
dated June 12. 1986 and two of which are dated August 12. 1992. These tax deeds
are null and of no legal force or effect to convey any title to Appellants because
Weber County did not have or hold anv title that it could convey. Under Utah law.
lawlul tax sale proceedings can only be based upon a failure to pay the taxes
assessed against the property sold and no validity attaches to any tax sale of
property concerning and for which the taxes have been paid and that never became
delinquent. Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Frcanhrack. 74 P.2d I 184, 1189 (Utah
1938); Hayes v. Cihhs, 169 P.2d 781. 786 (Utah 1946); Thirteenth South Ltd. v.
Summit Village Inc.. 866 P.2d 257, 259 (Nev. 1993], That is. a tax sale of
property for which the taxes have been paid in full and have never become
delinquent must be invalid ah initio. Appellants have not shown that Appellees"
taxes were even delinquent. Rather, they have conceded full payment oflhe taxes
by all Appellees. Utah law further provides that a person claiming title to real
property by reason of a tax deed is chargeable with notice of and takes subject lo
the full record chain of title. Hayes, 169 P.2d 781 at 784; See Also, Salt Lake
County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155.. 157-158, 2004 Iff 23; Utah
Recording Act, UCA §57-3-21(1). Additionally, in the case of Mason v. Loveless,
24 P.3d 997 (Utah 2001), the Court of Appeals held that purchasers of Tax Deeds
take title subject to and along with all of the inilrnmies of the prior owner, lor
example, in Mason, the Tax Deeds did not extinguish the preexisting boundary by
acquiescence claim of the neighboring property owner. Mason, 24 P.3d 997 at
1003.
fhe record title to and possession oflhe Buttars' property have
continuously been held and maintained by the Buttars and their predecessors in
interest at all times since the real properly, of which the Buttars1 property is a part.
was patented to Caleb Parry and Thomas Joyce, 'fhe Buttars and their
predecessors in interest have paid all of the real property taxes related to the
Buttars" property, whose legal description is contained in the tax notices sent by
Weber Countv. There is nothing in the record that would support any claim to the
contrary.
flic same is true with respect to the 12X12 and Questar Properties. They
and their predecessors in interest have also possessed and paid all taxes related to
their respective properties over a period of more than 20 years. 12X12 and its
predecessors in interest have been in possession and paid said taxes since at least
1980. Questar has been in possession since at least 1929. Accordingly, there have
been no unpaid real property taxes that could have provided Weber County with
any lawful basis for issuing the Tax Deeds to Appellants. Simply staled, the Tax
Deeds did not and cannot convey real property never owned by Weber County and
which Weber County never had a right to sell. Therefore, Appellants received
nothing from the tax sale because Weber County had nothing to sell or convey
relating to the aforementioned tax deeds.
II. The Title Conveyed By Tax Deed To Appellants Was Not
Superior To That Held By Appellees.
In the alternative, if Weber County did. in fact, convey title the real
property described in the 'fax Deeds held by Appellants. Appellants' arguments
must also fail because such title held through the Tax Deeds was not and is not
superior to and does not trump the title held by Appellees in this action. As noted
above, Utah law provides thai a person claiming title to real properly by reason of
a tax deed is chargeable with notice of and takes subject to the full record chain of
title. Hayes, 169 P.2d 781 at 784; Metro West, 89 P.3d 155 at 158; UCA §57-3-
21(1) According to Utah's Recording Statute. UCA §57-3-21(1}:
"fach document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it. if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
UCA §57-3-21( 1). In Metro West, the Utah Supreme Court in discussing this
issue with respect to a "wild deed" or "one executed by a stranger to the record
title," held that to be a good faith purchaser, "a subsequent purchaser must take the
property without notice of a prior, unrecorded interest in the property." Metro
West, 89 P.3d 155 at 158. citing Ault v. Hoklen, 2002 UT 33, %3 1, 44 P.3d781;
Metro West, at I59. "In addition, to be in good faith a subsequent purchaser must
also take the property Avithout notice of any infirmity in his grantor's title.'"
Metro West, 89 P.3d 155 at 158, citing Fender v. Bird, 119 Utah 91, 96, 224 P.2d
1057. 1059 (1950). Said notice can be actual notice or constructive notice, by
record or inquiry. Metro West, 89 P.3d 155 at 158. Record notice "results from a
record or which is imputed by the recording statutes/' Metro West, 89 P.3d 155 at
158, quoting First Am. Title his. Co. v. .IB. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834. 837 (Utah
1998). Inquiry notice "is presumed because of the lact that a person has
knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge
oflhe ultimate fact." hi. If the subsequent purchaser is found to have had eilher
12
actual or constructive notice, then they are precluded from having taken the
property in good faith and the prior unrecorded interest in the property takes.
Metro West. 89 P.3d 155 at 158.
In the Metro West ease, the Supreme Court of Utah was laced with the
issue of whether or not a purchaser who obtains title to property through a wild
deed is a bona fide purchaser under I hah's recording statute. In that case. Salt
Rake County received title to a 15-acre parcel in 1878 but failed to record its deed
to that parcel until 1998. In the meantime, an intervening purchaser came in and
purchased that property from purported owners in 1989. Metro West and the
county became involved in litigation to resolve the dispute. After going through
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Utah found that
because the 1989 transfer resulted from a conveyance where the Grantors had no
record title that it was accomplished through a "wild deed". The Court defined
wild deed as one executed by a stranger to the record title, 'fhe Utah Supreme
Court concluded "that a purchaser whose chain of title is founded on a wild deed
cannot be a bona tide purchaser" because that purchaser "is charged with notice of
what is shown by the records of the county recorder in the county in which the
property is situated". See Crompton v. denson. 70 Utah 55. 1 P.2d 242. 247 (Utah
1931) "and by implication charged with notice of what the records should show
but do not..." 'fhe Court went on to say:
"[ W ]c hold that by definition a purchaser whose title is founded on a wild
deed is on notice that his grantor had no record title to the property
purportedly being conveyed. This is true in instances where, as in this case.
the subsequent purchaser has obtained actual notice of this absence by
searching the records. Moreover, it is also true even when the purchaser
has no actual notice of the title defect, since all grantees of wild deeds are
necessarily charged with constructive record notice by virtue of the
recording statutes. Accordingly, a purchaser who acquires property
through a wild deed will be held to have been on notice of a defect in his
grantor's title and will not qualify as a subsequent purchaser in good faith
for purposes of 1Jtah's recording statute." (See Metro West at 159).
In the case at hand, it is clear that the tax deeds that are the subject of this
action are. in essence, wild deeds, under Metro West, in that they are deeds
"executed by a stranger to the record title." Metro West, 89 P.3d 155 at 159.
Thus, if a prior unrecorded interest in properly has a better position than the
purchaser of a wild deed certainly a prior recorded interest in the property (that of
12X12 and Buttars') has a better position than the purchaser of a wild deed. It is
clear and Appellants have conceded the fact that even the Appellees and their
predecessors in interest, including the Buttars and Adele B. Lewis, have all
occupied their respective properties, including the area up to the "very old fence"
lying between said properties, for more than twenty years. Additionally, it is clear
from the record and Appellants have conceded thai :ill of the Appellees have paid
the taxes assessed by the County for the property whose legal description is
contained on the lax notices received, finally, it is also clear that a visit to the
property by Appellants or Weber County would have put them on actual or. at
least, constructive notice of "the possibility oflhe rights of another."' Metro West,
89 P.3d 155 at 158. quoting Faldevco Ltd. F'ship v. City ofAuburn Hills, No.
202134. I99K Wh 1988569. *2. 1998 Mich. App. UUXIS 626. at *5
14
(Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 18. 1998) (unpublished per curiam decision). Because
Appellants had actual, or, at the very least, constructive notice of a prior
unrecorded interest in the property, their purchase is not in good faith and.
therefore, are precluded from taking the property over Appellees.
III. Appellants' Argument That Tax Deeds Enjoy Paramount
Title Constitutes Poor Public Policy
Appellants' main argument is that tax deeds are entitled to a high degree of
protection (Appellants' Brief page 9). Appellant has collected random comments
from Utah case law concerning tax deeds and their sanctity. While tax deeds have
a significant place in Utah real property law and they should not be treated lightly.
Appellant urges the court to hold that tax deeds are paramount to all other title.
Under Appellants* theory, a county could theoretically issue tax deeds and sell
them to the public to increase lax rev enues and thereby deprive long-standing
property owners of their property right without even providing them with notice.
Certainly if the court finds in favor of Appellants". Appellees' next course of
action is likely to bring an action against the county for deprivation ol'their
property without due process because the Appellees did not receive notice of these
tax sales. Appellants have never submitted any evidence that Appellees received
such notice.
It is unfortunate that Masseys purchased a tax deed which is traced back to
a wild deed, but they had constructive notice of this fact. Certainly the county
cannot do awav with the defect in the chain of title simply by holding a tax sale. If
this were the case, then such would fly in the face of sound real property law.
Property law is founded upon the long-term course of events relating to real
property, the recording statutes and the recorded deeds. Because the Appellees
had title to the property in question and occupied the same. Appellants were on
notice of this fact and should be held to that standard. Moreover, they should not
be able to show up at a lax sale and deprive other legitimate landowners of their
property rights through the back door.
In conclusion, the findings of fact and conclusions of law which were
entered by the trial court are appropriate. They are based upon sound principles ol
law and should not be disturbed. In the alternative, the Metro West case provides
solid grounds for upholding the court's ruling.
In addition, Appellants have relied upon the Kemmerer Coal Company v.
Brigham Young University, 723 f.2d 54 (Utah 1983) case, fhe holding in said
case was based upon statute of limitations and not based upon facts which are any
where similar to the facts at hand. In fact, Kemmerer is supportive oflhe
Appellees' position because it finds that the land claimant purchased its interest
after having record notice of a competing claim. Thus, the Kemmerer ease is
distinguished on its facts and is not persuasive authority supporting Appellants'
position.
CONCLUSION
fhe trial court appropriately granted Appellees* Motion for Summary
Judgment viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
Appellants and finding no dispute u> to material facts. 1he title held by
Appellants by Iax Deed are not superior to title held by Appellees. 1o make such
a finding would not only be incorrect, but poor public policy as well.
Additionally, the title held by Appellants is subject to any infirmities in (manor's
title which, when the chain ol*title is rev icwed. is completely defectiv e.
Moreover, such as boundarv bv acquiescence and adverse possession are doctrines
which are very helpful to Appellees. Appellants have conceded the facts that
Appellees and their predecessors in interest hav e occupied the disputed property
for more than 20 years prior to commencement of this action and hav e paid the
taxes assessed for their property \ov at least 20 years prior to commencement oi
this action. Appellant's claims also fail under I Uah law because they purchased
with notice, both actual and constructive, and are. thereby, precluded from being a
good faith purchaser and voiding any pre-existing interests in the disputed
property. 1he findings of fact and Conclusions of I.aw resulting in the "Order
Quieting 1itle to Real Property in 12X 12. L.L.C.. and in Aaron B. Buttars and
Brenda f. Buttars" arc. therefore, appropriately supported by the pleadings and
supporting documents submitted in the trial court's summary judgment
proceedings, fhis Court should find that the findings of fact and Conclusions oi'
Law appropriately supported, affirm the lower court's ruling granting summary
judgment to the Appellees as well as the ()rder Quieting Title to Real Property in
12 X 12. 1.4 .C. and in Aaron B. Buttars and Brenda L. Buttars.
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Hdward j. Stone, 9042
SIOWLLL & ASSOCIATES. PLLC
307 La:>; Stanton Avenue
Salt hake City, Utah 841 11
Telephone. (801)944-3459
Facsimile. (801)483-0705
I.N" THE SECOND .JUDICIAL DISTRICT C OIKT, WEBER COIN FY,
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OE UTAH
H.C. MASSLY and BETTY MASSF.Y AFFIDAVIT OE JOHN B. SI AID
Plaintiff, Case No. 9609000027
Judtie Rouer S. Dutson
KEN GRIFFITHS, et al
Defendant
I, JOHN B. STAHL, being first duly sworn under oath, slate as fol ows.
1. I am a registered land surveyor duly licensed to practice in the state ol ! tab and
am currently in good standing. I am the owner of Cornerstone Professional Land
Survevs, Inc.. and am able to make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge of
the matters contained herein.
2 Cornerstone Professional Land Surveys, Ine was requested by Kira F. Maefarlane
(now Kira E. Slawson) of Blackburn &. Stoll, LC to search and examine the public, quasi-
public and private records as could be obtained concerning property owned by BKB.
L.L.C. located at 1515 South 1200 West Street. Ogden. Utah. The request consisted of
three purposes: 1) review the record title to the properly For completeness. 2) review the
survey history to determine the positions of" the boundaries of the property, and 3)
determine the effect of a series of tax deeds upon the subject property.
3. Based upon my review of the records, it is my opinion that 1) the chain of title to
the BKB, L.L.C. property is continuous and unbroken from the original US of A paicnt
dated May 1, 1872 to the present. 2) documentation of privateand public surveys
consistenr.lv reflect the locations of the boundary' lines as presently occupied, 3) the root
VoO
Sep29UJUb:J7a Cnrr -stone i«-
uf title for the tax deeds conveyed to II C Massey and wife, Betty P. Massey are founded
upon a Quit Claim Deed dated September 25, 1979 purporting to con\ey property within
which no interest was held by the grantor, and 4) if the Massey Tax Parcel is found to be
located north of the BKB property feiKe. thai subsequent tax sale foreclosures by Weber
Countv were unfounded and unwarranted. The basis of my opinion is as iollow >.
a. All of the properties in dispute shaie a common source in title held b>
Caleb Parry by virtue oi j Patent from the I'S of A dated Ma;. I. 1872 and a
Warrant) Deed from 'Ibonus Joy ce dated February 28. 1894 (See Pg. 7, Sur\e>
Findings Report. May 15, 1998 by John B Stahl. PES)
h Caleb Parry divided the property by the conveyance oi' nine separate and
distinct parcels over a period of time from 1874 to 1929. Two parcels were
conveyed by the administer of the Estate of Caleb Parry in 1939 and 1950. ISee
Pgs. 8-15, Survev Findings Report)
(1) Fhree key parcel conveyances create the boundaries or the parcels
in dispute. Ihe First was conveyed by Warranty F)eed to Moroni S.
Marriott on July 12, 1880 recorded in Book M at Page 600
amended in Book () at Page 598. (See Parcel A6. Survey Findings
Report) Fhe second parcel, conveyed also to Moroni S. Marriott
bv Warranty Deed November 13.1 894. adjoins the First parcel on
the north. (See Parcel A7, Survey Findings Report) The third
parcel, conveyed by Warranty Deed June 26. 1(?29 to the Wasatch
Gas Company is consistently located adjoining on the north ot the
second parcel and on the west side of thecounty road (See Parcel
A9. Suney Findings Report)
The southerly two parcels are currently owned by Aaron B. and
Brenda L Buttais, the northerly parcel still being owned and
operated as a natural gas distribution facility by Questar Gas. (See
Pg. 17, Survey Findings Report)
(2) On September 4. 1943 the remainder of the Caleb Parry estate
lying west of the County Road was conveyed by Frances S. Parry,
wife of Caleb Parry, to Lucile P. Donhue, Myrtle P. Wells. Oscar
Leland Parry and C. Royal Parry as tenants in common each with
1/4 interest. {See Pg. 18. Survey Findings Report)
c. 'Fhe Willard Canal right of way was surveyed in 1960-1961 and acquired
by the United States ofAmerica March 24, 1964. (See Pg. 19. Survey Findings
Report)
^D J.
a«f^
d. On October 22. 1963, the remainder of the Caleb Parry estate lying east of
the Willard Canal, west of the county road, and south of the Central Pacific
Railroad right of way was surveyed and subdivided into tour parcels by L Paul
Oilmen, a registered land survey or. The survey described and idenlilied eaca ol
the four tracts as being Tract 1 on the north and Iracl 4 on the south
On October 28. 1903. title to Tract 1 was conveyed to Joseph A. Donahue
and wife. Fern E. Donahue, title to Tract 2 was conveyed to Myrtle P Wells, and
title to Tracts 3 and 4 was conveyed to Oscar L. Parry and Frances E. Hanks.
Title to Iracts 1 and 2 are currently neld by Beryl .1. Griffiths while title to Tracts
3 and 4 are currently held by BKB. L.L.C (See Pgs. 21 -24. Survey Findings
Report)
e. The south boundary of the subdivision was described by E. Paul Gilgen as'
"being West 942.09 feet and South 487.89 feel from the Last Quarter
Corner of said Section 24, and running thence South along {the center of
1200 West Street jl 87 feet; thence West along a fence 183 fee:: thence
South along a fence 40 feet; thence West along a fence 202 feet, thence
South along a fence 289.80 feet to the east line of the Willard Canal right-
of-way; thence Northwesterly along said east line as follows: ..."
Fhe fence line referred to above is the common fence between the property
occupied by BKB, L.L.C. and the properties occupied by Questar Gas and Aaron
B. and Brenda L. Buttars. The first two courses refer to the Questar properly
fence and the subsequent two courses refer to the Buttars property fence. (See Pg.
22, Survey Findings Report;
L Ihe Weber County Surveyor's office has documented evidence indicating
numerous positions for the location of the East Quarter Corner from which the
properties are located. The position of the East Quarter Cornet utilized by the
Gilgen survey is consistent with the Willard Canal survey. Jt is apparent from
retracement of other surveys in 1911 that the position of the Hast Quarter Corner
has been moved in excess of 80 feet in the north-south direction. (See Pg 30,
Survey Findings Report)
g. False assumptions ofcommon corner positions and common basis of
hearings used in 1880 with those used in 196.3 mislead leaving the impression that
a 110 foot high (north-south) parcel exists between the BKB and Questar/Buttars
properties. These false assumptions also result ma 26 foot wide (east-west) by
290 foot high (north-south) parcel between the BKB and Buttars property. Proper
deed interpretations and boundary survey retracement techniques reveal no such
f~ •"!
i O^
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property exists. The BKB. Questar and Buttars properties are contiguous. (See
Pgs 4 and 25, Survey Findings Report)
h. The tax parcels foreclosed upon by Weber County were based upon a Quit
Claim Deed executed by Myrtle P. Wells to Oscar Eeland Parry and Frances E.
Hanks on September 25. 1970. The dimensions contained in the tax parcel
descriptions originate liom the conveyances ol record for Iract 4 of the Gilgen
survey as well as ihe Questar and Buttars property descriptions. 1\y_ -_'
• _\N had no interest in the property described on the Qui:
Claim Deed. The Quit Claim Deed description is founded up-M: '••
•' <\ir-j from impioper interpretation oflhe descriptions o! record
'Fhe property described is occupied by QuesLir .•-•. • -
ind:cates:
(1) The language of the Quit Claim Deed is as follows:
"Pari oi the Southeast Quarter of Section 21. Township 6 North. Ranee 2
West. Sail Lake Meridian: Beginning 20 chains East anc 71 1 89 tee!
South of the Northwest come: of said Quarter Section and running
thence South 110 i 1 fee;, thence Last 176 feet: thence North 40 feet,
thence East 1}0 feet, thence South 40 feet; thence E;i.st n> a point V> est
942.09 feet from the Last line of said Quarter Section, [hence North
150 II fee.:, thence Wot IS 3 feet: thence South 40 feet: thence \V'e->:
EM.91 lee: to the point of beginning
ALSO. Pan of the Southeast Quarter of Section 24. Township 6 North.
Range 2 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian. U.S. Survey Beginning at
a point 1201 37 feet West and 1040 37 feet south of the hast Quarter
corner of said Section 24; ihcnce North 325.49 feet, thence West 35 "'
feet; thence South 2S9.80 feet, thence South 4501' Kast 5049 feet to
the place of beginning."
(2) Fhe first course to the point of beginning is "20 chains Hast" trom
the northwest comer, not the cast quarter corner as contained in the
record. Tvventv chains is equivalent to 1320 feet which, when
combined with the 1320 feet contained in the Buttars deed, equals
the ideal quarter section dimension of 2640 feet or precisely one-
half mile. A condition rarely found in reality. Washington Jenkins
determined the dimension in this case to be 2753.8 teet. A
difference of 113.8 feet.
(3) The second course to the point ofbeginning is "714.89 feet South"
from the Quarter Section Line. This dimension is revealed by
combining the Gilgen survey point of beginning tie, 487.89 feet,
and the frontage for Tract 4. 187 feet, with the frontage of the
4
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Questar property, 40 feet. Fhe indication is that the north line ot
the tax parcel is coincident with the south lines of the Questar
property and Iract 4. The tax parcel must, therefore, be located
south of the BKB property
(4) Fhe third covjsq. "South i 10.1 1 feet" is precisely the dimension
left over from combining the total dimension of 1320 feet South
with 7.5 chains North (495 feet t contained in the Buttars deed and
714.89 feet North contained in the BKB and Questar deeds. 1he
south line of the tax deed is coincident with the north line ot the
Buttars deed. Fhe tax parcel must, therefore, be located north oi
the Buttars property.
(5) Similar comparison of the remaining courses m the Qu:t Claim
Deed and subsequent comparison with the courses contained m the
tax deed descriptions reveal Findings consistent with those recited
above. The deeds attempt to describe property lying between the
BKB and Questar'Buttars properties which, in fact, do not exist
l. 'Faxes were, at all times, paid on all the property north of the fence line by
the owners of Tract 4. No five year lapse of payment has transpired on any ot the
property north oflhe fence line.
4. Further, it is my professional opinion, based upon the above, that 1) the Massey
Tax Parcel does not exist on the ground. 2) if the Massey 'Fax Parcel is located on the
ground, it must lie south oflhe fence line marking the southern boundary ot Tract 4 as
surveyed and descnbed by h. Paul Gilgen and subsequently conveyed to BKB. L.L.C.
and 3) that if the Massey Tax Parcel is located north of the fence line marking the south
line of Tract 4, the tax notice and subsequent sale were improperly conceived arv-
executed.
&?Dated this ^o "clay of KAqi/pW .2002
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me th is C**~- d av of
NOTARY PUBLIC
NOTARY PUBLIC
Uatthew Thornton
1344 W«ct 4675 South
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Wy Commission EipJret
Januiry 11.2005
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